We show how a C*-algebra naturally induces a topos in which the family of its commutative subalgebras becomes a commutative C*-algebra. Its internal spectrum is a compact regular locale, and the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to this spectrum having no points. (Quasi-)states become integrals, and self-adjoint elements become functions to the pertinent generalised real numbers (the interval domain). This provides a probabilistic interpretation of propositions in quantum theory. The topostheoretic truth value of such a proposition is the collection of pure states of commutative subalgebras that make it true; in a physical interpretation these are the pure states for a classical observer making the proposition true. These results were motivated by a topos-theoretic approach of the Kochen-Specker theorem by Isham and co-workers. Our main tool is the use of the internal mathematics of a topos, such as the constructive Gelfand duality of Banaschewski and Mulvey, which simplifies the computations and provides very natural connections between internal and external reasoning.
Introduction
Although the present article is mathematical in nature, its motivation lies in quantum physics. The ideology dates back to Bohr, whose 'doctrine of classical concepts' demands that quantum physics must be communicated entirely in terms of classical physics [40] . This leads to the interpretation of a specific measurement as only providing a 'classical snapshot of reality'.
Let us clarify this philosophy by considering a physical system with two degrees of freedom. States are then modeled as density matrices ρ, i.e. 2 by 2 positive complex matrices with unit trace. A measurement in a basis e = ((e 00 , e 01 ), (e 10 , e 11 )) of C 2 is represented by the map ρ → (eρe * ) 00 0 0 (eρe * ) 11 , where e = e 00 e 01 e 10 e 11 .
Hence measurement in the basis e = ((1, 0), (0, 1)) and measurement in the basis h = ((
)) do not commute. So if interested in measuring an
operator that is diagonal in a certain basis, one can only have perfect knowledge of other operators that commute with the corresponding operator.
The above example is a very simple case of bounded operators on a Hilbert space. In modern language, this situation is axiomatised, and the resulting structure is that of a C*-algebra. This is a complex Banach space A such that ab ≤ a b for all a, b ∈ A, and that has an involution (−) * such that a * a = a 2 . A C*-algebra is called commutative if the multiplication is. Hence, commutative C*-algebras represent classical systems, and noncommutative ones represent quantum systems.
Bohr's thesis thus translates to the proposition that an observer can only obtain the information present in a commutative sub-C*-algebra of the C*-algebra modeling the observed system, as her (incomplete) 'classical snapshot of reality'. The combination of all such snapshots should then provide a complete picture. The present article considers this combination in the rigorous logical framework of topos theory, and thus fits in the programme of making Bohr's doctrine mathematically precise. We will naturally arrive at the notion of a quasi-state that causes the Mackey-Gleason problem [8] , and contribute to the programme of Isham and co-workers (like [35, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 27, 28, 29] ) to address the related interpretational problems posed by the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Toposes
The technical tool enabling the construction in this article is a topos. Originally invented by Grothendieck as a generalisation of sheaves in algebraic geometry, Lawvere independently researched logical aspects, and with Tierney wove both strands together to arrive at the notion of an elementary topos [6, 45, 38, 43] . Thus every elementary topos comes equipped with an internal logic (the Mitchell-Bénabou language with its Kripke-Joyal semantics). A topos can hence be seen as a universe of discourse, to which the observer is confined. As opposed to this observer, a mathematician who is aware that the topos is only a part of a larger topos can choose to move to this ambient topos, thus changing his rules of thought. For example, one can interpret an intuitionistic theory of real numbers as a theory of real valued continuous functions by working in a sheaf topos, or interpret a classical theory of real numbers as real valued measurable functions by working in a Boolean valued model. The mathematician can then view the original topos in two ways: either externally, adhering to the rules of the ambient topos, or internally, by sticking to the logic of the original topos. Thus a topos is a universe of discourse to which an observer is internal, but which can still be studied from outside with meta-logic by a mathematician who is aware of this.
Perhaps the simplest example of a topos is the category Set of sets and functions. A slightly less simple example of a topos is the category Set C of functors from a category C to Set. We will mostly use the special case were C is a partially ordered set, regarded as a category. In fact, the partially ordered set will be that of 'classical snapshots of reality'. In our earlier example of the C*-algebra M 2 (C), a 2-dimensional commutative sub-C*-algebra is fixed by choosing an orthogonal basis of C 2 . Since a basis is already determined by one unit vector (x, y) in C 2 , such a commutative sub-C*-algebra looks like Hence all families of 1-dimensional commutative sub-C*-algebras of M 2 (C) are given by
for (x, y) ∈ C 2 with |x| 2 + |y| 2 = 1 and finally,
Collecting them, the set of 'classical snapshots of reality' in our example is C(M 2 (C)) = {I} ∪ {C (x,y) , D (x,y) , E (x,y) : x, y ∈ C | |x| 2 + |y| 2 = 1}.
This set is partially ordered by inclusion; its Hasse diagram looks like
D (x,y) E (x,y) D (x ′ ,y ′ ) E (x ′ ,y ′ ) · · · I P P P P P P P P P P P continued indefinitely for all (x, y) ∈ C 2 with |x| 2 + |y| 2 = 1. Therefore, a functor F : C(M 2 (C)) → Set assigns to every 'classical snapshot of reality' C ∈ C(M 2 (C)) a set F (C), such that D ⊆ C implies the existence of a function F (D) → F (C). We can think of F as assigning 'samples' to every 'classical snapshot of reality'. Typical of a coarse graining model is that sample sets assigned to larger-in-the-order elements provide more information. An illustrative example of the coarse graining interpretation is the interval domain describing real numbers. For example, π can be described by specifying the sequence of cuts (−∞, 3) ∪ (4, ∞), (−∞, 3.1) ∪ (3.2, ∞), (−∞, 3.14) ∪ (3.15, ∞), . . . ; as the sample sets grow, one has more knowledge about the number they converge to. Analogously, we will shortly see a functor F : C(M 2 (C)) → Set in which a larger sample set means a larger corresponding 'classical snapshot of reality', i.e. a sub-C*-algebra containing more observables, and hence more information.
Let us comment briefly on the internal logic of a topos in the context of our running example. For more information, we must refer the reader to e.g. [43, 38, 5] . The internal logic of a topos assigns a truth value to every proposition of higher-order, many-sorted logic. However, unlike in the topos Set, these truth values can be more general than the Boolean algebra {false, true}. In the case of Set C(M2(C)) , the truth value object Ω : C(M 2 (C)) → Set is given by
where a cosieve S on C is an upward closed subset of C(M 2 (C)) below C, in the sense that all its elements are contained in C, and moreover B ∈ S and B ⊆ B ′ imply B ′ ∈ S. One could think of such a cosieve on a 'classical snapshot of reality' C as the collection of all coarser versions of the knowledge present in C.
C*-algebras (in a topos)
In set theory, mathematical objects, such as the real numbers, are characterised axiomatically; the same can be done in any topos. Such an object can also be looked upon from outside the topos: we say it has an interpretation in the external logic. Consider, in the context of our running example, the particular functor F (C) = C. It turns out that this object of the functor topos Set
is in fact a commutative C*-algebra internal to this topos! Its interpretation F in the external topos might be a functor, i.e. a family of C*-algebras, but internally it satisfies all the properties of a single C*-algebra, which moreover is commutative. The various entities at play are illustrated in Figure 1 . In the topos Set one uses topological spaces to deal with continuity. However, and this will be very important to us, statements including points of topological spaces are often difficult to generalise to arbitrary toposes. Concretely, Gelfand duality does not generalise. However, it is often possible to resort to the lattice structure of the open sets of a topological space. These complete distributive lattices are thus called 'pointfree' spaces, or locales [37] . In the topos Set one can often reconstruct the points from this lattice; to be precise, there is an adjunction between the category of topological spaces and the category of locales, which restricts to an equivalence of categories between compact Hausdorff spaces and compact completely regular locales. In general, this equivalence is not present in a topos. Thus when trying to generalise theorems from the topos Set to an arbitrary topos one has two options: to focus either on the locales or on the topological spaces. Locales are often the better choice since a locale may be defined by a geometric theory, i.e. a theory which remains stable under geometric morphisms. Geometrically defined objects can thus be seen to be defined in a 'coordinate free way'. We will elaborate on geometricity shortly. We now turn to an example of the use of locales.
A fundamental fact that we will use heavily is the Gelfand representation theorem. In Set, it gives a duality between commutative unital C*-algebras and compact Hausdorff spaces. As explained above, when trying to generalise this we are encouraged to use locales. Indeed, in an arbitrary topos one can prove an equivalence of categories between commutative unital C*-algebras and compact completely regular locales. Details can be found in Section 2. The Gelfand representation theorem will be applied to the inner C*-algebra, supplying a compact regular locale, the spectrum Σ. As a direct consequence of the KochenSpecker theorem we see that for typical C*-algebras this locale has no (global) points -that is, there are no morphisms p : 1 → Σ.
Even if there are no, or not enough, global points, one can still work with generalised points -that is, maps p : U → Σ -of which there will always be enough. A crucial feature of geometric logic, and more generally of geometric mathematics, is that we can work as if locales had points. These points are then interpreted as generalised points. We will use this idea a number of times.
Geometric logic, the logic of observations
The last aspect of topos theory we would like emphasise here, is the observational interpretation of topology. Consider the basis of the topology of the real line given by the open rational intervals. Such intervals may be interpreted as finitary information about a real number: the real number under scrutiny is contained in the given interval. By making a number of observations, or measurements, about the real number, we can conclude that it is in the intersection of a finite set of rational intervals. We can also conclude that the number is contained in an arbitrary union of rational intervals, by simply observing that it is contained in one of them. On the contrary, it is impossible to conclude that the real number is in an infinite intersection of intervals, since this would require infinitely many observations. Note that these operations, finitary intersections and arbitrary unions, are precisely what defines a topology. When we forget about the encoding of topology in terms of set theory, we obtain a sup-lattice, i.e. a locale or pointfree space. Reading intersection as conjunction and union as disjunction results in a logic, the logic of observations. Hence the slogan is that topology is the logic of observations. We can extend this analogy as follows. A point x in a topological space defines a model of the corresponding theory of observations: a basic proposition (observation) I is true in the model x iff x ∈ I. This view leads us to consider theories (of observations) as primary objects of study; their models, the points, will be derived concepts. Thus topology is the propositional logic of observations. This relation can be extended to the theory of Grothendieck toposes, which may be seen as the predicate logic of observations; see [55] for a gentle introduction to the general theory [43, 38] . We will say a little more about this viewpoint in Section 2. Apart from the interpretational aspect of geometric logic just explained, there are also technical reasons in its favour. Firstly, geometric statements are preserved under the inverse image parts of geometric morphisms -the natural morphisms in the category of (Grothendieck) toposes. Secondly, geometric statements are particularly easy to interpret, see Proposition 1.
Main results and structure of this article Section 2 recapitulates Gelfand duality in a topos. It is somewhat technical, and may be skipped on a first reading. The main result of this article is the construction of a topos from a C*-algebra, inside of which resides an induced commutative C*-algebra. The construction of this associated topos is covered in Section 3, and the inner C*-algebra is dealt with in Section 4. Section 5 then considers the spectrum of the internal (commutative) C*-algebra. It is a locale, and the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to this locale in fact having no points. Subsequently we study the relationship between the external C*-algebra and the (interpretation of the) internal one. Two such results are that quasi-states of the external C*-algebra correspond bijectively to probability integrals on the internal one (Section 6), and that self-adjoint elements of the external C*-algebra internally may be embedded into functions to the pertinent generalised real numbers (Section 7).
To put the first result in context, let us work out its statement in our introductory example. A state of the (external) system is simply a 2 by 2 density matrix. A probability integral on the inner C*-algebra F (C) = C is interpreted as a family I C of probability integrals on every C ∈ C(M 2 (C)) such that
Hence a bijective correspondence between the former and the latter signifies that a state of the external C*-algebra determines the outcome of a measurement of the system in any reference frame, and vice versa.
The second result, the construction of the spectrum, answers a question of the Butterfield-Döring-Isham programme [28] . It seems to circumvent the limi-tation the Kochen-Specker theorem puts up. Recall that this theorem shows that in general there can be no definite assignment of real numbers to observables, the self-adjoint elements of a C*-algebra A, compatible with the appropriate algebraic rules. However, the result of Section 7 shows that one can embed A sa into functions from the spectrum of the inner C*-algebra to the generalised real numbers. This assignment, however, is not definite because its codomain is the interval domain instead of the proper real numbers. The apparent resemblance to Heisenberg's uncertainty relations is left to future work. Finally, the correspondence between quasi-states and internal integrals allows us to give a probabilistic interpretation of key propositions in quantum physics.
One can view these kind of results, relating the external C*-algebra and the internal commutative one, in two ways. First, they provide some support for research in non-commutative geometry. For example, the statement of Theorem 15, that states become probability integrals, can be seen as more evidence in favour of the definition of quantum probability space. The associated topos construction could be used to see whether a proposed definition on a non-commutative C*-algebra corresponds to a known one in the internal commutative case.
Secondly, the associated topos construction provides insight into the nature of quantum physics, as it gives a mathematical interpretation of Bohr's view. Although the physical universe might have laws of its own (the logic of the ambient topos), we, as observers, can only obtain restricted knowledge (using the logic of the internal associated topos we inhabit). To avoid confusing technical and interpretational issues, we have strived to keep the presentation strictly mathematical, and only in Section 8 connect the mathematical constructions to the interpretation of quantum physics. Section 9 concludes, and Appendix A discusses related work by Döring and Isham, which inspired the present article.
Constructive Gelfand duality
This section recapitulates the constructive Gelfand duality -that is, a version of Gelfand duality valid in every topos. In doing so, it will introduce some terminology and illustrate the use of geometric logic, which will recur often. Although the expository style of this article is informal in this aspect, it uses constructive reasoning. As a consequence all results can be interpreted in an arbitrary ambient topos, which we denote by S (except Theorem 11, where the reader will be reminded of this fact). Section 9 will indicate how, by choosing S to be a certain functor topos, our results may be relevant for algebraic quantum field theory. We assume all toposes to have a natural-numbers-object.
Readers knowledgeable about C*-algebras but unfamiliar with constructive and topos-theoretic constructions may like to skip this somewhat technical section on a first reading. Instead, they may substitute S = Set and think of ordinary C*-algebras, i.e. C*-algebras in the topos Set, and of a spectrum as a compact Hausdorff space.
The fundamental theorem about commutative (unital) C*-algebras is the Gelfand representation theorem, which characterises them completely as algebras of complex-valued continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff space. It can be shown that the essence of this theorem holds in any topos [4, 19] , a fact we recollect in Theorem 4 below. The paraphrase leading up to it is somewhat verbose, because the specifics are of importance in Section 4. It follows a presentation that avoids the Banach-Mazur theorem by working with the real, as opposed to the complex, structure of a C*-algebra [19, 20] . More importantly, this proof is entirely constructive and thus can be reinterpreted in any ambient topos. A geometric formula is one of the form
where the formulae ϕ and ψ are positive, i.e. they are built up from atomic formulae using only (finite) conjunction, (infinite) disjunction, and existential quantification. This is an important class of formulae, because geometric formulae are precisely the ones whose truth value is preserved by geometric morphisms between toposes. Since we mostly use functor toposes and objects definable by geometric formulae, the following proposition will be of use time and again. For instance, in Corollary 9 below uses it to characterise the inner C*-algebra in a functor topos as a functor assigning a C*-algebra to each object of the indexing category.
Proposition 1 [38, Corollary D.1.2.14] Let T be a geometric theory, and C any category. Denote by Mod(T, T) the category of T -models in the topos T with T -homomorphisms. There is an isomorphism Mod(T, S
C ) ∼ = Mod(T, S) C .
C*-algebras
We now give a definition of a C*-algebra. A C*-algebra has both algebraic and continuous aspects and is therefore naturally defined in a geometric theory. A *-algebra is a vector space A over the field of Gaussian integers C Q = {p + qi : p, q ∈ Q}, that carries an associative bilinear map · : A × A → A, and is furthermore equipped with a map (−)
and unital if there is a neutral element 1 for the multiplication. Next, we define a seminorm structure on this algebra. In general, the norm may not actually be definable in the internal logic of a topos. Hence we resort to a relation N such that (a, q) ∈ N may intuitively be interpreted as a < q. A *-algebra A is said to be seminormed if it is equipped with a relation
for all a, b ∈ A, p, q ∈ Q + , and z ∈ C Q . For a unital *-algebra, we also require
If the seminorm relation furthermore satisfies
for all a ∈ A and q ∈ Q + , then A is said to be a pre-C*-algebra. The usual construction of a C*-algebra would now require a = 0 whenever (a, q) ∈ N for all q in Q + , making the seminorm into a norm, and then complete this normed space. Both of these constructions are, however, not geometric and thus better avoided. Fortunately, there is a satisfactory solution: the localic completion [41, 54] . The localic completion assigns to every generalised metric space X a locale, the points of which are those of the completion of X. A C*-algebra is the localic completion of a pre-C*-algebra. Every C*-algebra is a *-algebra in the category of generalised metric spaces. A consequence of completeness is that a C*-algebra is automatically an algebra over the complex field C, considered as the completion of C Q ; for more details, we refer to [4] . Notice that all the above requirements are formulated geometrically.
A *-homomorphism between C*-algebras A and B is a linear map f :
Definition 2 Denote the category of C*-algebras and *-homomorphisms by
CStar, and its full subcategory of commutative C*-algebras by CCStar.
In the topos Set our notion of C*-algebra coincides with the usual one, by setting (a, q) ∈ N iff a < q. In Set C , the interpretations of C Q and C are constant maps -that is, an internal complex number is just a map c → z for some chosen z ∈ C that is independent of c ∈ C.
Lastly, a theory of C*-algebras cannot omit a review of the valuable notion of state on a C*-algebra.
A geometric theory of states will be provided in Section 6.
There are important C*-algebras which are not unital, for instance, C 0 (0, 1), the complex continuous functions on the real line which vanish outside the unit interval. However, it is often convenient to have a unit in a C*-algebra. Fortunately, one can always embed a C*-algebra A into the unital one A ⊕ C. In fact, this provides an endofunctor on CStar called unitisation. Using it, any positive linear functional can be normalised to a state provided its norm is bounded by 1.
Spectrum
We are now prepared to state the Gelfand representation theorem mentioned earlier. Instead of compact Hausdorff spaces, it uses the category of compact, completely regular locales [37] , denoted by CptCRegLoc. Thus it strengthens the ties between commutative C*-algebras and locales, both of which may be seen as topological spaces 'without points'.
A compact regular locale can be conveniently represented by a normal distributive lattice [18] , and in turn such lattices can be represented by normal entailment relations [15] . In topological (or better localic) terms, a lattice presents a basis while an entailment presents a subbasis. In logical terms, these entailment relations provide a propositional geometric theory and the distributive lattice is its syntactic category, often called the Lindenbaum algebra -that is, the poset of provable equivalence classes, ordered by provable entailment. The correspondence between entailment relations and (the points of) locales is the usual completeness and consistency link between theories and models. Entailment relations are thus used as a presentation of a space. Any lattice defines an entailment relation ⊢ by X ⊢ Y iff X ≤ Y . Conversely, an entailment relation defines a lattice by a ≤ b iff a ⊢ b. The presentation of a lattice guides the intuition of thinking of a lattice as a theory. The models of the theory correspond to completely prime filters, i.e. points of the locale presented by the lattice. Finally, in terms of locales, the theory is the locale and the models are the points of the locale.
Theorem 4 (Gelfand duality in a topos) There is an equivalence
which is valid in any topos. Here, the functor C(−, C) maps a locale to the set of locale morphisms from it to the locale C. The locale σ(A) is called the Gelfand spectrum of A.
We will not give the full proof, but only present the construction of the spectrum as a normal distributive lattice [20] . Let A be a C*-algebra. The Gelfand spectrum of A may be presented by the lattice freely generated by the symbols D a for a in A sa , subject to the relations
One can think of the symbol D a as representing the open set {ρ ∈ P (A) | ρ(a) > 0}, where P (A) is the set of pure states. These pure states coincide with C*-algebra representations A → C. This motivation will be made precise below.
Translating the rules for the lattice to the lattice of open subsets of the spectrum renders all of the above rules transparent.
The locale corresponding to this entailment relation is given by the frame with the same generators and relations above, but supplemented with the relation
A point of a locale is a completely prime filter of the lattice. Such a point corresponds precisely with a model of the theory. The theory proves that for all rational r < t we have D a−s or D t−a . Thus a model ρ of the theory precisely defines a Dedekind cut ({s | ρ |= D a−s }, {s | ρ |= D s−a }) for each a, and so defines a function A → R. In fact it may be seen to be a multiplicative functional. The symbol D a corresponds to an open in the locale, the points of which are the pure states ρ such that a(ρ) > 0, where · denotes the Gelfand transform. Consider, in the context of the example from the introduction, the particular functor F (C) = C defining the inner commutative C*-algebra. Its spectrum is then the collection of normal distributive lattices corresponding to σ(C).
If the Axiom of Dependent Choice is valid in the topos, as is the case in any topos of functors, then CptCRegLoc is equivalent to the category CptRegLoc of compact regular locales. If the full Axiom of Choice is available, it is equivalent to the category CptHd of compact Hausdorff spaces [37] and hence the constructive Gelfand representation is a true generalisation of the usual Gelfand representation in the topos Set.
For future reference we state the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let A be a C*-algebra, and P ⊆ A a linear property in the sense that P (a) ∧ P (b) ⇒ P (µa + iλb) for all µ, λ ∈ R and self-adjoint a, b ∈ A. If P holds on all commutative sub-C*-algebras of A, then it holds on all of A.
This lemma is not completely trivial since only normal elements are contained in commutative subalgebras.
3 The topos associated to a C*-algebra
This section will associate a topos to a C*-algebra residing in the ambient topos according to Bohr's 'doctrine of classical concepts'. We aim at a coarse graining interpretation. In such an interpretation one considers several views on an object, some finer, some coarser. The idea is that all views on all objects together form a picture of the system one is interpreting that is as complete as possible. An entity may not be defined when we look too closely, however, when we zoom out it becomes defined and from that point on stays defined. This hints at a partial order where C ≤ D means that C is finer than D, or, that D is coarser than C. Let us denote by Poset the category of partially ordered sets and monotone functions. We will not worry about the fact that Poset, like CStar and Topos, is a large category; when pressed one can limit these categories to a chosen universe to make them small.
Proposition 6
There is a functor C : CStar → Poset, defined on objects as
Recall that a geometric morphism F : S → T between toposes is a pair of adjoint functors, consisting of a direct image part F * : S → T and an inverse image part F * : T → S, of which F * is required to be left exact. Denote by Topos the category of elementary toposes and geometric morphisms [38] .
The following proposition gives the coarse graining model associated to a C*-algebra.
Proposition 7
There is a functor T : CStar → Topos, defined on objects by
The topos T (A) is called the topos associated to A. For future reference, notice that, being a functor topos, it validates the Axiom of Dependent Choice when S does [31] .
To conclude this section, remark that instead of the poset C(A), we could have considered the category with the same objects, but with monomorphisms instead of inclusions. The functor in Proposition 6 would then have the category Cat of categories as its codomain. This would have still allowed us to define the associated topos, and also the inner C*-algebra we will define below. From then on, most constructions will be within the associated topos, and hence go through as well.
The inner C*-algebra
Whereas the previous section considered the topos T (A) associated to a C*-algebra A, this section is devoted to a particular object A in this topos. It will turn out that this object satisfies the requirements of being a commutative C*-algebra within T (A). In fact, the definition of A is trivial.
Via the forgetful embedding CStar → Set, we identify A with an object of T (A).
Proposition 9 A is a commutative C*-algebra in T (A).
Proof Since the definition of a commutative C*-algebra consists only of geometrically definable objects (e.g. C) and geometric formulae (see Section 2), it follows from Proposition 1 that A is a commutative C*-algebra in T (A) because every A(C) is a commutative C*-algebra in the ambient topos.
The structure of A as a C*-algebra in T (A) is inherited locally from A as follows. It is a vector space over C by
since C(C) = C. The multiplication and involution are given by
Recall that the subobject classifier Ω in T (A) is the functor assigning to C ∈ C(A) the collection of cosieves on C. It has ∅ as a bottom element, and the maximal sub-co-sieve {D ∈ C(A) | D ⊆ C} as a top element. The norm relation is given by
One easily checks that these are indeed natural transformations, and hence morphisms in T (A), and that this structure indeed satisfies the requirements for A to be a C*-algebra in T (A). Notice that A, as a C*-algebra in T (A), in general does not have many elements. An element a : 1 → A is fixed by its value on a bottom element of C(A), if one exists. However, generalised elements (i.e. natural transformations a : U → A for some U ∈ T (A)) are plentiful.
The functor A is called the inner C*-algebra. By changing the universe of discourse from the ambient topos to T (A), the not necessarily commutative C*-algebra A has become a commutative C*-algebra A. We stress that the multiplication of two non-commuting operators is no longer defined, since they live in different commutative subalgebras. However, as we will see in Section 6, states can still be retrieved internally.
The spectrum and dispersion-free states
The next two sections relate constructions on the inner C*-algebra A to constructions on the original C*-algebra A. But first, this section considers the structure of A itself in more detail. Like any commutative C*-algebra, it is determined by its spectrum. Applying Gelfand duality (i.e. Theorem 4) within the topos T (A) to the commutative C*-algebra A yields the following.
Corollary 10 There is a unique functor Σ ∈ T (A) such that within the topos T (A), Σ is the spectrum σ(A) of A, and as such is a compact regular locale.
We stress that we have applied the unitisation functor to A. Instead of the spectrum of A we have thus constructed its one-point-compactification. The spectrum of A is actually the open sublocale obtained by removing the point at infinity.
Since the theory of spectra is geometric, an invocation of Proposition 1 yields that the interpretation of a spectrum in a functor topos is a spectra-valued functor. More precisely: Σ(C) is the Gelfand spectrum of C ∈ C(A) -it is the normal distributive lattice representing σ(C). This means that if D ⊆ C, then Σ(D) ⊆ Σ(C) is an inclusion of normal distributive lattices, which, alternatively, represents an epimorphism in the category of locales, see Section 2.
Let us illustrate this by computing the internal spectrum Σ of the running example M 2 (C) of the introduction. Since the spectrum is computed locally, it is given on objects by the following lattices.
The extra element ⊤ 1 in the lattices representing the spectra of D (x,y) and E (x,y) results from the application of the unitisation functor to them. The required locale map e.g. Σ(D (x,y) ) → Σ(C (x,y) ) then simply is the evident inclusion of lattices in the other direction.
Kochen-Specker
In general, the locale Σ is highly non-spatial: the Kochen-Specker theorem [39] shows that the functor Σ has no global sections [11, 12, 13, 14] , or, in other words, that it has no points as a locale in T (A). The following theorem makes this statement precise. Recall that there are isomorphisms between global points of the locale Σ, global sections of Σ, and (internal) pure states on A. Such a pure state is an (internal) multiplicative functional v : A → C, and thus corresponds to a consistent choice of such functionals on all commutative subalgebras. The Kochen-Specker theorem deals with the (non-)existence of the assignment of values to observables (self-adjoint operators) in such a way that they are consistent on any commutative subalgebra. In a precise way, it denies the existence of pure states on the internal commutative C*-algebra.
Theorem 11 (Kochen-Specker) Let H be a Hilbert space with dim(H) > 2 and let A be the C*-algebra of bounded operators on H. Then the locale Σ in T (A) has no points.
The Kochen-Specker theorem holds for a more general C*-algebras then just the collection of all bounded operators on a Hilbert space, see [25] for results on von Neumann algebras. For C*-algebras one has [34] : a simple infinite unital C*-algebra does not admit a dispersion-free quasi-state. The previous theorem also holds for such extensions. Thus, e.g. the spectrum of the internal C*-algebra associated to a simple infinite C*-algebra does not contain a point. The present case is a dramatic illustration of the failure of the Krein-Milman theorem in a constructive context [46] . (The classical Krein-Milman theorem states that a compact convex set is the closed convex hull of its extreme points.) We will see in Section 6 that the integrals (i.e. the states) are a compact convex set. Its extreme points are pure states, i.e. the points of the spectrum. These points, however, fail to exist, as we have just seen.
We have thus shown that in general, e.g. when the ambient topos is Set, the locale Σ has no points. Since we do not need this no-go theorem in a positive way, we have not bothered to try to generalise the Kochen-Specker theorem to a general ambient topos.
(Quasi-)states as integrals
This section and the next one are concerned with connections between the two levels we have developed (see also Figure 1 ):
1. the ambient topos S, containing the C*-algebra A;
2. the associated topos T (A), containing the inner commutative C*-algebra A and its spectrum Σ.
The motto will be that complicated constructions at level 1 are translated to familiar constructions at level 2.
This section discusses an isomorphism between quasi-states on A at level 1 into probability integrals on A at level 2. The precise statement and proof will be given in Theorem 15, but first we discuss all its constituents.
States and quasi-states
Recall that a state ρ : A → C is called faithful when ρ(a * a) = 0 implies a = 0. The states of a C*-algebra form a convex set, the extremal points of which are called pure states. States are automatically Hermitian, in the sense that ρ(a * ) = ρ(a), or equivalently, ρ(a) ∈ R for self-adjoint a. Consequently, a state ρ is faithful if and only if ρ(b) = 0 implies b = 0 for all self-adjoint elements b.
In algebraic quantum physics, states are often used to model the physical states of the quantum system. However, when taking Bohr's 'doctrine of classical concepts' seriously, one should actually be concerned with the outcome of certain classical measurements. Two observables can only be added when they are jointly measurable, i.e. when the corresponding operators commute. Thus a 'quantum state' is forced to be linear only on commutative parts. This leads to the notion of a quasi-state [1] . Axiom VII of Mackey's foundation of quantum mechanics [44] states that a measure on the projections of a von Neumann algebra extends to a state on the von Neumann algebra. Mackey stresses that, in contrast to his other axioms, Axiom VII does not have a physical justification. One can prove that a measure extends to a quasi-state, so one is lead to consider whether every quasi-state is a state. This is not the case when the von Neumann algebra has a summand of type I 2 , but it holds for all other von Neumann algebras [8] . For C*-algebras the question is more difficult. The main result seems to be the following [9] . Consider a C*-algebra with no quotient isomorphic to M 2 (C) and let ρ be a quasi-linear functional. Then ρ is linear iff ρ restricted to the unit ball is uniformly weakly continuous.
Algebraic integration theory
The following string of definitions gives an abstract (and constructive) version of integration theory based on ordered vector spaces, abstracting from the Riemann, Lebesgue and Daniell integrals [21] . It is similar to the theory by Kunze and Segal [51] , who developed integration theory based on algebras with positive linear functionals -that is, the commutative variant of so-called noncommutative probability.
Definition 13
Let R be an ordered vector space over R. A vector u is a strong unit when for each x there exists a natural number n such that −nu ≤ x ≤ nu.
The self-adjoint part of any commutative C*-algebra A is an example of a vector lattice by defining a ≤ b to mean ∃ c∈A [b − a = c * c]. One verifies that the above indeed defines a partial order structure on the C*-algebra A and that A sa is an ordered ring. One also proves that A satisfies the requirements of being a vector lattice with strong unit. This construction was an essential ingredient in the proof of Gelfand duality (Section 2).
Definition 14 An integral on an ordered vector space R is a linear functional
I : R → R that is positive, i.e. if f ≥ 0 then also I(f ) ≥ 0. If R has a strong unit u, then an integral I satisfying I(u) = 1 is called a probability integral.
Except in the degenerate case I(u) = 0, any integral can be normalised to a probability integral. An integral is faithful when its kernel is {0}.
The prime example of such an integral is the Riemann or Lebesgue integral on the ordered vector space C[0, 1]. More generally, any positive linear functional on C(X) where X is compact Hausdorff, i.e. a Daniell integral, provides an example. Moreover, the bounded integrable functions L ∞ with respect to such an integral again form an ordered vector space. By the Stone-Yosida representation theorem, every ordered vector space with a strong unit in which the order forms a lattice, embeds densely into such a space C(X) and the integral can be extended to this new space. This 'embedding' identifies x, y when |x − y| ≤ 1 n for all n ∈ N. It is thus an embedding when the ordered vector space is an Archimedean Riesz space [42, 56] . This, however, can not be defined geometrically. The situation is thus similar to that of seminorms on pre-C*-algebras. In a sense, C(X) with a positive linear functional is also the only example. All of this can be proved constructively [22, 53] .
The theory of integrals
We are now almost ready to prove the promised correspondence of quasi-states to probability integrals. However, as a final ingredient we need a geometric theory INT of integrals on an ordered Q-vector space R with strong unit u [21] . For a rational number q, we will write f − q for f − qu. The ordered vector space defined from a commutative unital C*-algebra has 1 as a strong unit. The lattice INT is the distributive lattice freely generated by P(f ) subject to the relations
It can be shown that the models of the theory INT correspond to positive linear functionals. The intended interpretation of P(f ) is ρ(f ) > 0 for such an integral/model. More precisely, P(f ) is the open of the locale of integrals, the points of which are all ρ satisfying ρ(f ) > 0.
Integrals and quasi-states
A positive (quasi-)linear functional ρ can be extended uniquely to the unitisation of a C*-algebra by defining ρ 1 (a + λ1) := ρ(a) + λ, resulting in a (quasi-)state ρ 1 . Moreover, since unitisation is faithful and preserves monomorphisms and epimorphisms, we may thus assume C*-algebras to be unital in the following.
A commutative unital C*-algebra naturally defines an ordered vector space in which the unit for the multiplication is a strong unit with respect to the order. The statement of the next theorem crosses two levels of Figure 1 : it connects states of A (at level 1, i.e. in the ambient topos) to integrals on A (at level 2, i.e. within the topos T (A)). Because it is impossible to describe the external C*-algebra A from within T (A), but it is possible to reason about the inner C*-algebra in the ambient topos, the connection is formally made at the outermost level. That is, we prove a correspondence in the ambient topos of states of A to functors C(A) → S that behave as integrals within the topos T (A).
Theorem 15 There is an bijective correspondence between positive quasi-linear functionals on A and integrals on A, i.e. models of the theory INT. Moreover, quasi-states correspond to probability integrals, and faithful positive quasi-linear functionals correspond to faithful integrals.
The proof below shows that this correspondence actually has a lot of structure. However, it seems difficult to make this precise without repeating the proof.
Proof Every positive (quasi-)linear functional defines an integral-valued functor by restriction to each commutative part.
Conversely, let I : A → C be an integral. We recall that these integrals, as models of a geometric theory, are computed locally, as in Proposition 1. To prove that an integral corresponds to a positive quasi-linear functional, we denote by C(a) the C*-algebra generated by a ∈ A. Define ρ : A sa → C by ρ(a) = I C(a) (a). For commuting a, b ∈ A,
, and I is locally linear. Hence ρ is quasi-linear. Moreover, ρ is positive because I is locally positive. Thus we have defined ρ on A sa . It extends by linearity to all of A, retaining positivity by Lemma 5. In fact, since every self-adjoint a can be written as a = a 1 + ia 2 for normal elements a i (i.e. satisfying a * i a i = a i a * i ), it would have sufficed to define ρ on normal elements, and extend by linearity. To verify well-definedness, suppose a = a 1 + ia 2 already happened to be normal. Then a 1 a 2 = a 2 a 1 , so that C(a 1 , a 2 ) is commutative. Consequently,
Thus ρ is indeed a well-defined positive quasi-linear functional on A. It is clear that the two maps are inverses of each other, so that we obtain the required isomorphism.
The facts that the unit and faithfulness are preserved hold directly by construction.
Quantum probability
A classical probability space (Ω, F, µ) consists of a set Ω, a σ-algebra F over it, and a probability measure µ. The space L ∞ of bounded measurable functions with respect to some σ-algebra is a commutative unital von Neumann algebra and a probability measure defines a state on it. Conversely, any commutative unital von Neumann algebra N on a separable Hilbert space with a state ρ on it may be presented as such by a spectral theorem. Hence one can think of a classical probability space as a commutative unital von Neumann algebra with a state on it. Quantum probability theory has been developed as a noncommutative analogue. A quantum probability space is a triple (H, P, ρ) of a Hilbert space H, its set of projections, and a state on the unital C*-algebra of its bounded automorphisms [47] . A little more abstractly, a quantum probability space is thus a pair (N, ρ) of a (not necessarily commutative) unital von Neumann algebra and a state on it [17] . Even more abstractly, and along the lines of [51] , one takes a C*-algebra with a state on it and if needed constructs the von Neumann algebra by the GNS construction. Hence Theorem 15 shows that the construction of the inner C*-algebra turns a quantum probability space into a classical one by changing the ambient topos.
Integrals and valuations
Measure theory is concerned with the trinity measures, integrals and valuations. Measures are defined on certain σ-algebras of (Borel) sets. Integrals are positive linear functionals on the ordered vector space of continuous (or Borel or measurable) functions. Finally, valuations are like measures, but defined only on the open sets. Valuations are lower semi-continuous. By the Riesz representation theorem there are isomorphisms between all three concepts. This correspondence can be defined geometrically. There is an isomorphism between the compact regular locale of integrals on an Riesz space and the locale of valuations on its spectrum [21] . Constructively, valuations, being lower semi-continuous, have their values in the lower real numbers. In the present context, this allows us to assign probabilities to opens in the spectrum of the internal C*-algebra. This will be used in Section 8.
To make the connection with measures on projections we need to change the setting slightly since C*-algebras, in general, do not have enough projections. So we consider AW*-algebras. An AW*-algebra is a C*-algebra, all the maximal commutative subalgebras of which have a Boolean spectrum, i.e. the spectra are Stone spaces. Let A be an AW*-algebra and consider the partially ordered set of all its commutative AW*-subalgebras. As above we define the functor topos over this partially ordered set and consider the internal AW*-algebra A. This is a commutative AW*-algebra and its spectrum is therefore a Boolean algebra, and, in fact, a Stone space. As before, there are isomorphisms between quasistates on A, probability integrals on A and valuations on Σ. Such a valuation is precisely a measure on projections, familiar from the Gleason theorem in the Hilbert space axiomatics of quantum theory.
Self-adjoints as generalised real numbers
This section exhibits a connection between self-adjoint elements of the external C*-algebra A and generalised real numbers in Sh(Σ). The latter is another topos, internal to T (A); this will be explained shortly. The connection is made in two steps: first we prove that real numbers in Sh(Σ) are isomorphic to selfadjoint elements of the inner C*-algebra A. Then we show that there is a monomorphism of self-adjoint elements of the external C*-algebra A to generalised self-adjoint elements of the inner C*-algebra A. In turn, these generalised self-adjoints then correspond to generalised real numbers.
To make the situation more precise, let us first recall the notion of Dedekind cut, a standard way to define real numbers in any elementary topos. Intuitively, a Dedekind cut consists of an upper half and a lower half of the real line that come arbitrarily close. The generalised real numbers alluded to above drop the property that the halves should 'touch in precisely one point'; instead, there can be an entire interval between them. Moreover, the upper and the lower halves of a generalised real number do not need to be inhabited any more, allowing for infinity. Below, we will call these generalised real numbers 'cuts'.
Definition 16 Let Q be a partially ordered set. A cut of Q is an ordered pair
(L, U ) of subsets of Q, satisfying q ∈ L ↔∃ r∈Q [(q < r) ∧ (r ∈ L)], q ∈ U ↔∃ r∈Q [(r < q) ∧ (r ∈ U )], ¬(q ∈ L ∧ r ∈ U ) (for q ≥ r).
The collection of all cuts of Q is denoted by Q ↔ . A Dedekind cut is a cut of Q that moreover satisfies
Notice that the set of (Dedekind) cuts of Q is defined by geometric axioms. Hence the (Dedekind) cuts-object may be geometrically defined from Q, and is preserved under inverse image parts of geometric morphisms of toposes when Q is, see e.g. [54] .
The cuts of any partially ordered set (Q, ≤) are again partially ordered by
This order extends to cuts of functors
In the topos of sheaves over a locale L, the Dedekind real-numbers-object is characterised by the fact that its global elements are the locale morphisms L → R [38, Corollary D.4.7.5]. In particular, in a functor topos
the global elements of the Dedekind real-numbers-object are the functors F : C → S that constantly result in a singleton real number.
Within the universe of discourse T (A), we can consider sheaves on Σ, since according to the logic of this topos the latter is a locale by Corollary 10. Our stack of nested (internal) toposes has thus gained a level:
2. the associated topos T (A), containing the inner C*-algebra A and its spectrum Σ;
3. the topos Sh(Σ), containing the (Dedekind) cuts-object.
Combining this knowledge with Section 2 results in the following lemma, that establishes an isomorphism between self-adjoint elements of A (at level 2) and Dedekind cuts (at level 3).
Lemma 17 [38, Corollary D.4.7.5] The interpretation of the real number object in
We would like to extend this result to level 1: given a self-adjoint element of A (at level 1), we would like to construct a self-adjoint element of A (at level 2). However, since the given a ∈ A need not be present in every C ∈ C(A), we can only obtain a 'partially defined' corresponding element of A. The theory of domains accounts for partiality, providing several ways of dealing with this concept. An often successful one is the approximation of objects by certain order intervals. This technique turns out to be applicable here. We approximate a by intervals as best as we can in every C ∈ C(A). To obtain a correspondence as in the previous lemma, we then consider cuts of Q instead of Dedekind cuts. This so-called interval domain [50] is often seen as a generalisation of the real numbers [48] . It is generated by rational intervals, ordered by reverse inclusion: a smaller interval means that we have more information (about the number that the ever smaller intervals converge to). However, because of its approximative nature, the correspondence is just a monomorphism instead of an isomorphism.
Proposition 18
There is a monomorphism δ :
for C ∈ C(A). It preserves and reflects order:
Proof Let b ∈ L a (C). Then b ≤ a, so that there is c ∈ A with a − b = c * c, and
Hence every L a , and analogously every U a , is indeed a subset of A sa . One easily verifies that δ(a) satisfies the axioms for a cut of A sa : L a is a lower set, U a is an upper set, both sets are open, and L a < U a by definition. Thus δ is a well-defined morphism.
In the notation of Lemma 5, we thus have L a (C(a)) = L a ′ (C(a)) and U a (C(a)) = U a ′ (C(a) ). Hence for all ε ∈ Q + we have a − ε < a ′ < a + ε. Taking limits in A gives a = a ′ , proving δ to be a monomorphism. Showing that it preserves and reflects order is trivial.
Notice that the lower and upper halves L a (C) and U a (C) of the cut δ(a) can be empty. When C is unital this never occurs.
Although δ preserves and reflects the order structure, it does not cooperate so well with suprema. In a general C*-algebra, this operation is not defined for noncommuting operators, but it can be defined for the projections in a von Neumann algebra. The running example of the introduction provides a counterexample where δ does not even preserve binary supremum. Denote by diag(a, b) the 2 by 2 matrix with a, b ∈ C along the diagonal and zeroes elsewhere. Then, in the context C = C (1,0) ∈ C(M 2 (C)):
The monomorphism δ of the previous proposition could be named 'daseinisation', as it ensures a's 'approximation' δ(a) C is present in a reference frame C ∈ C(A) (see Appendix A). Combining Lemma 17 and Proposition 18 now gives the monomorphism we were after.
Theorem 19 There is a monomorphism δ from self-adjoint elements of A into cuts of Q in Sh(Σ).
Proof One readily verifies the following trivial adaptation of Lemma 17: there is an isomorphism between cuts of self-adjoint elements of A and cuts of Q in Sh(Σ). The statement now follows from the combination with Proposition 18.
The 'daseinisation' monomorphism δ of Proposition 18 can be envisioned as consisting of two phases. Let us denote the downset of a ∈ A sa by ↓a = {b ∈ A sa | b ≤ a}, and by ↑a the upset {b ∈ A sa | a ≤ b}.
Recall that ↓a is a principal order ideal, and ↑a a principal order filter.
Definition 20 Let (X, ≤) be a partially ordered set. A subset I ⊆ X is an order ideal when
• it is a lower set: for every x ∈ I, if y ≤ x then also y ∈ I; and
• it is directed: for every x, y ∈ I, there is a z ∈ I with x ≤ z and y ≤ z.
An order ideal in (X, ≥) is called an order filter.
Hence the first phase a → (↓a, ↑a) of δ simply maps a self-adjoint element to its principal order ideal/filter. This is similar to the embedding of the real numbers into Dedekind cuts x → (↓x, ↑x), except that the latter needs to be intersected with Q to get the Dedekind cut (↓x ∩ Q, ↑x ∩ Q). Indeed the second phase of δ is (↓a, ↑a) → (↓a∩C, ↑a∩C) for C ∈ C(A). Notice that this is again an order ideal/filter pair in A ↔ sa , that is, however, not necessarily principal anymore. The latter fact is the only obstruction to δ being a full order isomorphism instead of just preserving and reflecting it -it is not an epimorphism.
Interpretation of Quantum Physics
Quantum physics can be formulated using C*-algebras [30, 33, 40] : classical systems are modeled by commutative C*-algebras, quantum systems correspond to non-commutative C*-algebras, and key physical operations on systems (unitary evolution and measurement) are represented by completely positive maps.
Let us briefly put the previous constructions in this context. Given a C*-algebra A modeling some (quantum) physical system, C(A) is the collection of all 'classical snapshots of reality', all the classical reference frames available to us, whose use yields information about the given physical system. Hence, as observers, we are confined to the topos T (A), whereas the physical system itself exists in the (larger) ambient topos S. According to Bohr, the system might seem to behave intrinsically probabilistically, from our limited classical perspective, but Theorem 15 exhibits that this is just a consequence of our confinement to T (A). The actual physical system has a definite state that determines the probabilities of all observations we might make, and vice versa. Furthermore, Theorem 19 demonstrates that the existence of such a state assigns to each observable a definite, (generalised) real value -we will say more about the interpretation of this in Subsection 8.1. The Kochen-Specker theorem is thus circumvented by admitting that we cannot perfectly measure all observables of a physical system simultaneously. (Moreover, a generalised real number is not a very 'definite' value.) The term 'neo-realistic' has been coined for the existence of a state space in the above sense [26] -that is, a realistic interpretation in which the truth values need not be restricted to classical logic.
Interpretation of propositions
In mathematical physics one ultimately focuses on statements of the form: "Is the observable f contained in the interval ∆?". For instance: "Is the position of this particle within that region of space?". In a probabilistic interpretation an observable f will be a measurable function. One may then consider the measurable set f −1 (∆) as an event and compute the probability that this event occurs. These measurable sets form a Boolean algebra and hence may be considered as a 'logic'. The event f −1 (∆) is the interpretation of (the equivalence class of) the 'proposition' "f ∈ ∆". This analogy is the basis for what is sometimes called 'quantum logic', the study of the orthomodular lattice of projections of a Hilbert space. There is, however, an alternative way of obtaining a logic. A probabilist will speak of f as a random variable. In the topos of sheaves over a topological space, the internal real numbers are interpreted as 'variable' real numbers, i.e. real-valued continuous functions. With this motivation a topos theorist considers a random variable as a variable real number in the topos of sheaves defined by measure space [36] . The underlying locale is the same Boolean algebra as before, and random variables (measurable functions) are real numbers in this topos. We work towards a similar topos, but arrive at a Heyting algebra, the spectrum of the inner C*-algebra. The main difference is that observables, which replace the random variables, are interval valued. Consequently, the expectation will also be interval valued. To wit, given an observable a of a system modeled by a C*-algebra A, we want to know how " δ(a) ∈ ∆" is interpreted in the topos Sh(Σ) (using the notation of Theorem 19).
Theorem 21
Let a ∈ A sa . Let ∆ = (p, q) be an interval (of cuts) in Sh(Σ). The interpretation of the proposition " δ(a) ∈ ∆" in the ambient topos is the set of pure states ρ of some C ∈ C(A) such that ρ(δ(a)) ⊆ ∆ at C:
Here, the Scott brackets − denote the interpretation of an object or proposition.
Proof Unravelling the interpretation of the internal language of Sh(Σ) in T (A) yields the open sublocale δ(a) ∈ ∆ = δ(a) −1 ∆ of Σ (in T (A)). Next we consider the interpretation of the internal language of T (A) in S, that for C ∈ C(A) results in
where we used, respectively, that the spectrum is computed locally by Lemma 1, that C(Σ, Q) ↔ , C(Σ, Q ↔ ) and A ↔ sa are in bijective correspondence according to Lemma 17 , and that the points of the spectrum of a commutative C*-algebra are its pure states by Theorem 4.
In words: the interpretation of the proposition that an observable assumes a value in a certain interval is the collection of pure states that make this proposition true for a classical observer. (Notice that its proof used the Axiom of Choice in the meta theory to actually construct the points, i.e. the pure states.)
The previous theorem nicely exemplifies how topos theory can make precise a somewhat vague statement: the proof of the theorem is simply an unfolding of definitions, but topos theory cleanly separates interpretational issues from computations in a specific topos.
In the previous theorem the interval ∆ was internal. If moreover an (external) state is available, there is an analogon that examines whether an observable assumes a value in an external interval ∆, as follows. In words: the truth value of the proposition that in a given state an observable assumes a value in a certain interval is the collection of 'classical snapshots of reality', or classical observers, for which this is true. It is also possible to formulate the above in terms of generalised elements of the subobject classifier Ω, that intuitively is the object of 'truth values'. Analogous to Theorem 21, an observable a ∈ A sa and an interval ∆ in Q ↔ give a 'proposition', or generalised element of Ω
Moreover, if a quasi-state ρ : A → C is available, there is a generalised truth value for the proposition that δ(a) ∈ ∆ in state ρ as follows. First, ρ corresponds to an integral I ρ : A sa → R by Theorem 15, and hence to a valuation µ ρ : O(Σ) → R ← by Subsection 6.2. So we can consider the smallest sublocale
of Σ, which corresponds to a subobject f ρ : F ρ Σ. In the study of random sequences, such a sublocale has been considered as the locale of random elements with respect to the valuation µ ρ [52] . Finally, composing this 'state' with the above 'proposition' yields a generalised truth value F ρ → Ω. The subobject f ρ : F ρ Σ is also characterised by a morphism χ f ρ : Σ → Ω, i.e. a predicate on Σ, and the characteristic morphism δ(a) ∈ ∆ : Σ → Ω also corresponds to a subobject u a,∆ : U Ω. Instead of composing f ρ with χ δ(a) −1 ( ∆ ) , we could also have composed χ f ρ with u a,∆ to get a generalised truth value U → Ω. Fortunately, both pairings agree on the intersection (i.e. pullback) of the two subobjects f ρ and u a,∆ . Hence the labels 'state' and 'proposition' are interchangeable.
Probability
Let us elaborate on the previous discussion. One might argue that all scientific questions are probabilistic, and therefore, that our basic question should not be to what extent " δ(a) ∈ ∆" is true, but, given a state of the system, to what extent this proposition holds with a probability more than a given threshold ε. Fortunately, such an interpretation is possible. Given an external (quasi-)state, Section 6 produced an internal integral. There is a locale isomorphism between integrals and valuations with values in the lower reals; see Subsection 6.2. So a predicate "µ( δ(a) ∈ ∆) > q" is available. Moreover, when U and V are two opens in Σ such that U ∨ V = Σ and p < q with 0 ≤ p + q < 1 we have that µ(U ) > p or µ(V ) > q. In case Σ is Boolean, we have that µ(U ) > p or µ(¬U ) > 1 − 2p, which is precisely the standard form of statistical tests.
Conclusion and future work
The main construction presented in this article started from a possibly noncommutative C*-algebra. Subsequently, we devised a category of its commutative sub-C*-algebras and considered the topos of S-valued functors on it. Finally we produced an induced commutative C*-algebra in this topos.
The (quantum) physical interpretation of this is an instance of Bohr's 'doctrine of classical concepts'. The external, possibly non-commutative, C*-algebra is then seen as modeling a (quantum) physical system. The category of its commutative sub-C*-algebras is regarded as the collection of 'classical snapshots of reality', and the ensuing functor topos is thought of as a coarse graining model of the possible knowledge of a classical observer. Finally, the inner commutative C*-algebra represents the (quantum) physical system as seen by a classical observer.
We exhibited two ties between the external C*-algebra and the internal one. First, we proved that there is an isomorphism between quasi-states on the external C*-algebra and probability integrals on the internal one. This provided a probabilistic interpretation of propositions.
The second result answers a question of Döring and Isham [28] as it analyses the connection between self-adjoint elements of the external C*-algebra and real numbers in the induced topos. We proved there is an order-preserving and orderreflecting monomorphism of self-adjoint elements of the external C*-algebra to generalised real numbers in the topos of sheaves on the spectrum of the internal C*-algebra.
Finally, we discussed results of measurements in the (quantum) physical interpretation. We made this rigorous by proving that the truth value of the proposition that an observable assumes a value in a certain interval is the collection of pure states that make this proposition true for a classical observer.
Future work
Given a C*-algebra A in the ambient topos, we have discussed a construction of a topos T (A) and the induced commutative internal C*-algebra A. This construction works for any algebraic theory instead of C*-algebras, such as groups or rings. For rings a similar construction as for C*-algebras is possible. One first considers the functor topos given by its commutative subrings. The inner ring is commutative. Its Zariski spectrum can be constructed as a locale, and hence we can consider the topos of sheaves over it.
The Gelfand spectrum Σ of a C*-algebra A is a locale in T (A), and hence we can consider the topos of sheaves over Σ within the universe of discourse T (A). In the case of a C*-algebra (the various connections between) these three levels of toposes give rise to an interpretation of quantum physics. The theory not only provides a smooth mathematical foundation for Isham's 'neorealistic' interpretation of quantum theory, it also suggests the following new directions.
• The category Topos inherits Cartesian products from Cat. Also C*-algebras can be composed, but there is no canonical tensor product on CStar. Hence one could investigate the relationship between the topos T (A ⊗ B) associated with the composite system and the product of the associated toposes.
• In mathematical physics it often helps to divide out symmetries. For example, one could consider an intermediate level between the ambient topos and T (A), namely the topos U -Set of sets acted on by the group U of unitaries of the given C*-algebra A.
• An Algebraic Quantum Field Theory [3] is a functor (O(M ), ⊆) → CStar satisfying certain separability constraints. Here M is the Minkowski manifold and O(M ) its poset of opens. Analogously to Corollary 9, one now proves that an AQFT is a C*-algebra A in the topos Set (O(M),⊆) of Setvalued functors on Minkowski space. Presenting an AQFT as a covariant functor of C*-algebras, even in the more complicated case of general relativity, has been emphasised in [7] . (It has also been tried to extend such results to sheaves [32, 49] .) One could thus consider another intermediate level between the ambient topos and T (A). This is one way of making the similarity between quantum theory and relativity theory in [23] more precise; see also [5, Section 8.2] .
In Algebraic Quantum Field Theory one often considers symmetries defined by the the translation group, or the Poincaré group P , suggesting another level P -Set. There are thus various stacks of nested (internal) toposes to be studied.
• Recently, dagger compact categories have been proposed as a type theory for quantum computation [2] . Via the Doplicher-Roberts duality [24] , such a category C gives rise to a compact group G under some natural requirements. In turn, every compact group G yields a C*-algebra C * (G), its so-called group C*-algebra. It seems likely that there is a relationship between classical types (i.e. the so-called classical objects [16] ) in C, and the finite-dimensional 'classical snapshots of reality' in C(C * (G)), the closure of which is the entire C(C * (G)).
• Even if p, q ∈ A sa do not commute, Proposition 18 still allows one to consider δ(p) in the commutative C*-algebra C ∈ C(A) generated by q.
The price one has to pay for this is that δ(p) is a cut of self-adjoints in the internal C*-algebra A instead of a proper self-adjoint element. For two elements l ≤ p ≤ u in the cut δ(p) we now have
in A. Given any (quasi-)state on A, we obtain a probability integral on C by Theorem 15, which can only be computed with bounded precision. This is somewhat reminiscent of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
• The main contribution of the current presentation is the definition of a well-defined truth value to questions about what is true now, without having to resort to an (external) observer. An aspect of quantum theory that is largely lacking is the dynamics of the system. However, a shadow of the Schrödinger picture, where states change over time but the observables in the C*-algebras are constant, can be distinguished inside the topos: a change in states can be seen internally as a change in the integral, or expectation. Via Theorem 15, one can thus consider expectations that change over time as the dynamics of the system, at least that part of it that is observable internally.
• Choosing the ambient topos to be an effective topos could enable one to answer questions about computability in physics.
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A Related work
This appendix shows that the present article is both an instance of and a generalisation of the programme set forth in [26, 27, 28, 29] , and compares both approaches. The Döring and Isham programme proposes to use a topos containing two special objects, a state object and a quantity object. The topos T (A) associated to a C*-algebra A is an instance of such a topos, with state object Σ, the interval domain as quantity object and A ↔ sa as observables. This is very similar to the one example of such a topos that Döring and Isham give, namely that of presheaves over the preorder category First consider the state object. To differentiate, we denote the spectral functor of Corollary 10 by Σ, and the state object of [27] by Σ ′ . Notice that in the case A = B(H), there is a faithful embedding of V(H) in C(A).
Theorem 23
In case A = B(H) is the C*-algebra of bounded operators on a Hilbert space H, we have Σ(C) = Σ ′ (C) for every C ∈ V(H).
Proof As shown in Section 2, Σ(C) is (a distributive lattice representing) the Gelfand spectrum of C, and thus equals Σ ′ (C) for every C ∈ C(A).
Although C(A) and V(H) agree on objects (types admitting), the toposes S C(A) and S
V(H)
op are opposites of each other. We note that in previous work [35] , Isham considered the same direction of arrows as in the present work. We consider this to be the most natural one for coarse graining, since the intended meaning is that the objects become more defined when we consider them in a coarser, less refined, way. Let us emphasise that by considering only commutative von Neumann subalgebras, the internal spectrum σ becomes a Boolean algebra, in fact a Stone space. This also suggests that this construction allows AW*-algebras instead of von Neumann-algebras, as AW*-algebras are an algebraic abstraction of von Neumann algebras.
As for the quantity object, Döring and Isham [28] define the outer daseinisation function δ o C : C sa → C first on projections p ∈ C proj by δ i C (p) = {q ∈ C proj | q ≤ p} This is then extended to self-adjoint a ∈ C sa by the spectral calculus:
where p λ is a spectral family (of projections) with a = R λdp λ . There is an analogous inner daseinisation. In the general von Neumann-algebra setting, this can be characterised in a simple way, as the following theorem shows. However, the reader deserves to be warned that this result does not hold in an arbitrary ambient topos since it uses classical reasoning. The previous result easily extends to C*-algebras instead of von Neumannalgebras by the GNS construction, and one is naturally led to consider {c ∈ C sa | a ≤ c} for any C*-algebra C. Thus, the injection of Proposition 18 is essentially the daseinisation δ = (δ i , δ o ), except that there is no need for the infimum/supremum (which may indeed not exist for C*-algebras) in the domain of cuts. This again enables us to work with more general C*-algebras than just von Neumann-algebras.
Moreover, using the generalised real numbers enables us to answer Döring and Isham's question about the relation between the quantity object and real numbers. The key to this is Corollary 10, the topological structure of the spectral functor Σ. This knowledge furthermore streamlines the calculations by allowing the use of the internal logic of the topos to define and reason about e.g. the spectrum Σ, which then takes very little effort.
